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I, Introduction
With the adoption of floating exchange rate systems by major industrialized
nations, theories of exchange rate determination have been influenced by "asset
models" in which exchange rates are determined similar to other asset prices. In
particular, Mussa (1979) showed that fluctuations in exchange rates appear to be
well described by random walks. That is, the best forecast of a future exchange
rate is the current rate; actual changes are drawn independently from a
probability distribution with a zero mean. 1 Any changes, therefore, in exchange
rates can be viewed as permanent: effects of a shock are not reversed over time.
The implications of such random walk conclusions for the short run are
interesting. If shocks are indeed permanent, general belief in existing exchange
rate models seems unsupported. For instance, a random walk is inconsistent
with the notion that "overshooting" models and Purchasing Power Parity ("law of
one price") are a useful guide for long run exchange rate movements. 2
Results in this paper show that applying specific techniques designed to
analyze long run behavior of time series variables provides evidence that long run
movements in exchange rates differ from random walks. Long run behavior, for
both the DM/$ and Y/$ spot rates, exhibit a rather substantial mean reverting
1 See Hakkio and Pearce (1985) for a brief discussion of Mussa's (1979) findings. See Huizinga (1987) for a
discussion of Meese and Rogoff's (1983) random walk conclusions.
2 The "overshooting" notion is a variation of the monetary model. For instance, an unanticipated increase in the
money supply will cause the exchange rate to fall by an amount greater than required in the long run. Exchange
rates will then slowly appreciate back towards the long run equilibrium value. In its most simplified form,
Purchasing Power Parity asserts that nominal exchange rates are determined by the ratio of domestic and foreign
prices, so that a standardized basket of goods cost the same in both countries. See Baillie and McMahon (1989),
p221 for an overview of empirical studies.
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component, a temporary component similar to that found in stock prices (Fama
and French [1988]; Poterba and Summers [1988]).3 That is to say, a diYergence of
observed market values from fundamental values cannot simply be interpreted as
support for models of inefficient markets. 4 Rather, these divergences may be
temporary swings away from fundamental values. Over some range, these
swings are eliminated and values return to their mean. Such temporary swings
and their subsequent reversion to the mean can be translated into·the statistical
hypothesis that exchange rates contain a slowly decaying stationary (OF -.
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transitory) component. With such a transitory series, the effects of a given shock
i

are reversed over time.
If nominal exchange rates exhibit mean reverting tendencies (and
information of this behavior is readily available to market participants), then it
would seem plausible that expectations of future exchange rates should also differ
from random walks.S Recently, Frankel and Froot (1987, 1988) provided evidence
which rejects random walks in expectations offuture spot rates. Using survey
data of forecasts, they found that short run expectations seem to based on recent
trends in the spot rate. Such "extrapolative" expectations are different from the
long run "regressive" ones in which exchange rates are expected to return to an
equilibrium value such as Purchasing Power Parity.
Estimating expectations models similar to those used by Frankel and Froot
(1988), I find that expectations for both the one week and one month horizon seem
3 Both the Fama and French (1988) and Poterba and Summers (1988) find that over long horizons stock returns
exhibit mean reverting behavior which is consistent with stock prices containing a stationary component. Though
the two studies use different statistical methods, both find that variations due to mean reversion can account for a
part of the return variances for long horizon returns. Using similar tests, Huizinga (1987) detected mean reversion
in monthly real exchange rates.
4 For stock prices, one measure of fundamental value is the present discounted value of future di\idends.
Calculating a "fundamental" value for exchange rates is also subject to different theories such as Interest Rate or
Purchasing Power Parity.
S Random walk or static expectations implies that the expected value for a future spot rate is the current spot rate,
t+1 = St, since any changes in the expected value are caused by a random error tenn.
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consistent with what are implied by the actual long run movement in exchange
rates. Namely, with the long run predictability implied by mean reversion, a
given appreciation in a currency should lead investors to expect a future
depreciation, and a given depreciation should lead to an expected appreciation. 6
This contradicts Frankel and Froot's (1988) finding that forecasters tend to
"extrapolate" recent trends for one week and one month horizons.
Such a contradiction can be explained once the different sample periods are
examined. Whereas Frankel and Froot's (1988) data set covered only the period
between 1984 and 1986, the data used in this paper extend from 1984 through 1989.
As such, there is no a priori reason to believe that the way in which forecasters
formed their expectations remained consistent between the two sub-periods, 1984 1986 and 1987 - 1989.
This assertion that the way expectations were formed did not remain
constant between 1984 and 1989 can be supported if we consider the international
monetary climate during the mid 1980's. In the wake of the extreme appreciation
and depreciation of the dollar between 1984 and 1986, finance ministers from the
G7 publicly committed themselves during their famous Louvre Accord (February
1987) to stabilize the dollar in order to prevep.t future volatility.? Presumably, such
public announcements (if believed to be credible) could cause changes in the way
market participants formed their expectations. Simple Chow tests reveal that,
indeed, there is no reason to believe that regression coefficients of the expectations
models remained constant throughout the sample period.

6 Questions concerning the rationality of this .behavior is not addressed in this paper. For the sake of brevity.
whether or not the specifications for expectations used in this paper are rational is not a primary focus. These
expectations mechanisms are only intended to provide a glimpse as to how expectations may be formed.
Dominguez (1986) rejects rationality in the MMS data set from 1983 through 1985. Tests of rationality for the
current data set could be a focus for future research.
7 Actually, the dollar began appreciating as early as 1981. Members of the G7 include the United States, Japan,
Germany (then West Germany), France, Britain, Italy, and Canada.
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Section II uses Fama and French's (1988) model for stock prices to outline
an exchange rate model that is composed of a transitory and a permanent
(random walk) component. This section also shows that standard random walk

-

tests may not be able to distinguish between a series composed of a random walk
and another series composed of a random walk plus a transitory component.
Section III contains a discussion of the data used. I provide in Section IV results
which suggest that both the DMI$ and Y/$ spot rates contain a slowly decaying
transitory component. Section IV also outlines possible explanations for the
source of temporary components, particularly the implications of coordinated
exchange rate policy. Section V examines some specifications of the way
expectations are formed, and whether or not these specifications produce results
which are consistent with actual movements in exchange rates. I conclude with
final remarks in Section VI.

II. Simple Model of Exchanee Rates 8
Long-horizon predictability contradicts empirical findings that movements
in log exchange rates appear to be well captured by random walks. An accepted
test of the random walk hypothesis focuses on unit roots in autoregressive
specifications (i.e., tests for a coefficient of one in an autoregressive process).
However, as Huizinga (1987) notes, such a "'random-walk' univariate process
merely indicates that lagged values of the variable itself cannot be used to predict
future changes." (p.150) Modeling exchange rates in a similar fashion as Fama
and French (1988) modeled stock prices, it can be shown that if exchange rates
contain both a transitory and a permanent component, observing unit roots
cannot be interpreted as supporting a pure random walk hypothesis.

8 This section draws extensively from Fama and French (1988), pp.248-252.
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Suppose that the spot rate, Stt is composed of a stationary (transitory)
component,

~t,

and a permanent random walk component, 'Vt> with

~t

as an AR(l)

process.
(1) ~t = P~t-l + l'lt
(2) 'lit = 'IIt-l + ).l + Et

where Il is the drift, /p/<l, and Tlt and Et are white noise. We can then let St be a
weighted average of the random walk and transitory terms:

Substituting in (1) and (2) into (3), we get
(4) St = a'llt-l

+ (l-a)p~t-l + <lEt + (l-a)Tlt + all

Since Bt-l = <X'Ift_l+(l-a)~t-l' or a'llt-l = St-l - (l-(l~t-l' we can substitute into (4) to get
(5.a) St = St-l - (l-a)(l-P)~t-l + <lEt + (l-a)Tlt + all, or
00

(5.b) St - St-l = <lEt + (l-a)Tlt + (l-a)(p-l)Lpi-lTlt_i + all
i=l

Equation (5.a) implies that if exchange rates are composed of both permanent and
transitory components, the spot rate at time t is equal to the spot rate at time t-l
plus a collection of white noises and drift. So, in such a series, we should expect to
observe unit roots: the coefficient from regressing St on St-l should be
insignificantly different from one.

s-.; \- _:~" ,

If exchang~ :-a;es--conF a transitory component, then mean reverting
behavior can be 'xpl~ined
~

.--/

py. examining the decaying autocorrelation of this

component; If we fet-<i>k be the autocorrelation of the k-period difference in the
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transitory component, i.e.,

(~t +k- ~t) = <!>It(~t- ~t-k)'

then, as Fama and French

(1988) show, <!>It approaches -ae/2ae, or -1/2, for large k (p.250).9 They note that

although the transitory component cannot be observed directly, we can infer the
existence of this term and its properties by regressing (St +k- St) on (St- St-k), where
a negative coefficient implies mean reversion. If changes in the random walk
and transitory components are uncorrelated, Fama and French (1988) show that:

where St is composed of a
random walk and a transitory
component as in equations (3)
through (5), 'Yt is an error term,
and

The coefficient,

~k,

in (6.b) measures the proportion of the variation in k-period

difference of exchange rates which is explained by the mean reversion of the
decaying transitory component,
component,

~k in

~t.

If exchange rates do not contain a transitory

(6.a) is equal to zero. On the other hand, if exchange rates

contain only a transitory component, ~k=<!>It and ~k approaches -1/2 for large k.lO
........::.
Thus, mean reversion of the transitory portion tends to push ~k towards -V2
as k increases, while the white noise term in the random walk tends to push it
towards zero. Fama and French (1988) show that since the variance of the error
term in the random walk component grows with k, the white noise component
eventually dominates. This implies that if exchange rates contain both a random
walk and a transitory component, the coefficient
pattern as k increases.

~k

in (6.a)

~Jorm

", -\ \

lj"1.J

aU-shaped

~
J

9 If there is no transitory component, then CPk=O.
10 Using monthly returns for NYSE stocks, Fama and French (1988) fmd significant mean reversion past the one
year horizon.
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III. Data
The average of Friday closing bid and offer prices for the DMI$ and VIS spot
rates are used as proxies for the weekly closing price. This weekly series
extending from January 1984 through August 1989 was provided by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland. Using weekly data captures short run movements
better than other studies which used monthly or yearly exchange rates; and five
full years of weekly data covers a longer horizon than other studies which use
weekly or monthly data for three years (Frankel and Froot [1988]). In addition, the
series beginning in 1984 includes the extreme appreciation (and the subsequent
depreciation) of the dollar between 1984 and 1986. If exchange rates do indeed
contain a transitory component, behavior during this period should contribute to
the "long" horizon predictability. 1 1 The sample period also coincides with
increasing investors' perception of the Fed's credibility in maintaining a stable
monetary growth policy, thus suggesting possible corrective stabilization of
fluctuations. 12
Table I contains brief descriptive statistics for weekly percentage changes
in the Y/$ and DMI$ spot rates. During the sample period, the DMI$ spot rate
changed, on average, .1273% (in absolute terms) per week: the Y/$, .1745% per
week. The largest one week appreciation for both the DMI$ and Y/$ spot rates was
almost equal at 4.159% and 4.693%, respectively. As for the largest one week fall in
spot rates, the DMI$ witnessed an 8.304% plunge compared to the Y/$'s sharpest
decline of6.779%.

11 What is considered as a "long" horizon in this paper may not be acceptable to many who believe that "long
horizon" entails several decades. Nevertheless. in terms of weeldy movements. five years seems to constitute a
relative long - if not medium - horizon.
12 After October 1979. the Federal Reserve emphasized a stable monetary growth target For a discussion see
Urich and Wachtel (1981).
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Table I
Descriptive Statistics for Weekly Percentage Changes in ¥/S and DMJ$ Spot Rates
(January 1984-August 1989)

Abs. Mean
% change

Obs.

Max.

Min.

Std. Error
of Mean

Y/$

287

.1745

4.693

-6.779

.0895

DM/$

287

.1273

4.159

-8.30-+

.0998

Figure I
Weekly DM/$ and Yen/$ Spot Rates
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January 1984 through August 1989

Figure I depicts weekly movements in the DMI$ and Y/$ spot rates. For both
the Y/$ and DMI$, a clearly observable pattern emerges. From the beginning of
1984 through early 1985, the DMI$ and Y/$ spot rates increased; the dollar
appreciated approximately 20% to reach its peak ofDM 3.38 and Y 262 in February
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of 1985. After this, the dollar steadily depreciated and has remained relatively
stable since early 1987.
Calculating investors' expectations regarding exchange rates is a difficult
task. The established method of estimating expectations using forward rates
poses serious problems. The apparent risk premium contained in forward rates
creates a gap which separates forward rates from expectations of future spot
rates.
Under the assumption of forward market efficiency, expectations of future
spot rates are assumed to be rational; that is, [EtSt+n/QtJ = [St+n], where EtSt+n is
the expected spot rate for time t+n based on the information set available at time t,
Qt. In addition, forward rates are assumed to be unbiased estimators of expected
future spot rates, i.e., ft,n=[EtSt+n/QtJ, where ft,n is the n- period away forward rate
at time t. If the forward market efficiency hypothesis were true, the difference
between ft,n and St+n should have a zero mean and not be serially correlated.
Therefore, expected changes in exchange rates, as reflected in the forward
discount (ft - su, should be equal to the actual change (St+l - St). A common test for
forward market efficiency is to estimate A. in the following regression:
(7) Bt+l - St = a + A(ft - sJ + <i>t+l
where St+ 1 is the log of the spot rate
in t+ 1, ft is the log of the forward
rate in t, CPt+l is a random error term,
and efficiency implying a=O, A=1.
That is, regress the ex post change in the spot rate against the forward discount at
the beginning of the period. Under the null hypothesis that forward discounts are
equal to actual changes, the coefficient should be unity. Fama (1984) reports A.
significantly less than unity. And as he notes, it is recognized that A. different
from one can result from time varying risk premia in the forward rate (p. 321); for
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instance, coefficient less than one can be interpreted as suggesting that the
expected appreciation of the dollar as reflected in the forward rate is greater than
the ex post appreciation of the dollar. 13
A better measure of expected exchange rates can be obtained through
surveys of forecasts by market participants. These surveys serve as a proxy for
expectations without the interference from risk premia. Expectations (forecasts)
for one week and one month horizons were obtained from Money Market Services
of Belmont, California. Each week MMS conducts direct phone surveys with
approximately 30 professional exchange rate forecasters and reports their median
response. Data on weekly surveys for one week forecasts are available from
November 1984 through September 1990. Surveys for one month forecasts were
conducted on a bi-weekly basis from 1984 through the early months of 1985, after
which they were conducted weekly.
Survey data on expected exchange rates for longer horizons are available
from the Financial Report (for three, six, and twelve month horizons) and Amex

Bank Review (for six and twelve month horizons). Though these data may be
useful measures of longer-horizon expectations, I use only the MMS data. The
shortcoming of the other two surveys is the relatively limited number of
observations. The Amex Bank Review conducted only twelve surveys between
January 1976 and July 1985: the Financial Report only 38 between June 1981 and
December 1985.14
13 Simple efficiency can be outlined as: ft,n=[EtSt+nlntl and [EtSt+nlntJ = [St+n]. A more general outline of
efficiency is: ft,n=[EtSt+n/Otl + RPt,n and [EtSt+n/nil = [S1+o1, where RPt,n is the risk premium. See Levich
(1989), p.47. Frankel and Froot (1988) note other studies regressing against forward discounts. There are many
interpretations of negative estimates of the coefficient in equation (7), one of which is that forward markets are
inefficient. This paper does not make an attempt to detennine market efficiency or inefficiency. Rather, the point
of the above discussion was merely to suggest that using forward rates as measures of expectations may be
inappropriate. Dominguez (1986) notes that since exchange market efficiency does not preclude the existence of a
risk premium, tests which reject the joint hypOthesis of risk neutrality and rationality do not provide clear
evidence of efficiency. These results may simply reflect the time varying risk premium.
14 Frankel and Froot (1987), data notes.
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As noted by Dominguez (1986), the "methodology and respondent sample"
used to obtain these forecasts "inspire unusual confidence". Respondents are
professional economists and forecasters with major international institutions
who have access to minute-by-minute information on all relevant factors. In
addition, the business careers of these forecasters are dependent on the accuracy
of the predictions. Criticisms that the survey responses may not be truthful or
that they do not represent the marginal investor seem less problematic.
Regardless of the objections raised for using survey data, at the very least, these
data provide insightful information concerning investors' expectations. IS

IV at Temporary Components
A common test of the random walk hypothesis focuses on testing for unit
roots in an autoregressive process. Using weekly DMI$ and Y/$ spot rates from
January 1984 through August 1989, I found
(8) St = <X +

J3 in the regression

J3st-l + Vt>

where st is the log of the spot rate
and Vt is a random error term.
insignificantly different from unity. The inability to reject the unit root hypothesis

=J

in Table II seems to suggest that weekly movements in spot rates are well

captured by random walks. We saw in Section II. however, that if exchange rates
are composed of both a transitory and a random walk component, as in equation
(5.b), we should expect to observe unit roots.
In general Cochrane (1988) showed that a first difference stationary series

with a unit root can be interpreted as a series composed of a random walk and a
15 Investigations by Engel and Frankel (1984), Pearce and Roley (1985) and others suggest that MMS survey data
for the MI have desirable properties such as unbiasedness and efficiency.
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Table II
St = a + (3St-l + Vt
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimates 16

SE

Obs.

t: (3=0

Prob>/t/

D\V

DM/$

287

.993

.004

215.389

.0001

1.906

¥!$

287

.995

.003

307.119

.0001

1.854

• Each currency is given an intercept tenn which is not reported here. Standard errors are
SUR calculated standard errors.

transitory component. Thus, if exchange rates are modeled as a combination of a
transitory and a random walk component, as in equation (5.b), the inability to
reject the unit root hypothesis in equation (8) cannot be interpreted as supporting
a random walk hypothesis. In such a series, unit root tests can only provide
information as to whether the series contains a random walk or is composed of a
random walk plus a transitory component.
Since error terms of a random walk preocess (i.e., St = St-l + Vt) are assumed
to be serially uncorrelated, a more direct test of the random walk hypothesis
involves estimating a in the following regression:
(9.a)

Vt = avt-l

+ ~t which is equivalent to

where St is the log of the spot
rate, ~t is a random error term,
and a=O if exchange rates follow a
random walk only.
16 Estimating coefficients individually using OLS may not be accurate. Because exchange rates are measured
relative to the U.S. dollar, triple arbitrage opportunities may cause cross-correlation in the error terms of the
regression. Zellner's (1962) "seemingly unrelated regression" technique ....ill improve the precision of the
estimates.
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Table III shows Seemingly Unrelated estimates of a for the DMI$ and¥!$ spot
rates.

(St - St-l)

Table In
= a + a(st-l -

St-2) + 0t

Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results.

Obs.

DM/$
¥/$

286
286

a

.009
.081

SE

t: ~=O

DW

.046
.047

.204
1.71*

1.928
2.038

• He: Random Walk, a=O.
•• Each currency given an intercept tenn which is not reported here.

* Significant at the 5% (one-tailed) level.
These results suggest, particularly for the Y/$ spot rate, that exchange rates
contain more than a pure random walk component. We can, at 5% significance,
reject the null that the Y/$ spot rate follows a random walk only. Evidence for the
DMI$ is not as convincing. Implied in Table III is that the Y/$ spot rate contains a

larger temporary component, whereas the DMI$ spot rate seems to be explained
more by a permanent component, with the temporary portion having little
influence, if any at all.
It may be evident by now that equation (9.b) is a special case of equation (6.a),
(St +k- St)

= f3k(st;- St-k) + 'Yt, the k difference autocorrelation, with a=f3k and k=1.

Thus, testing the hypothesis that random walks have uncorrelated error terms is
qualitatively equivalent to testing for the existence of a mean-reverting, transitory
component at the one week horizon. Results in Table III indicate that, at the one
week interval, the Y/$ spot rate contains a temporary component which has not
begun to revert to a mean. Though we cannot reject the hypothesis that error
terms for the DMI$ spot rate are uncorrelated, we cannot conclude from this that
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the DMI$ spot rate does not contain a transitory component. Based on equations
(6.a) and (9.b) all we can say is that the transitory component of the DMIS spot rate
does not seem to be detectable at the one week horizon. If a temporary component
exists, it may be detectable over longer intervals.

~ (0J'tV'
\I
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. .., '1'(:'';II v

Table IV

,. ,

Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimates of Equation (6.a)
(St +k- St) = (l + Pk(SC St-k) + 'Yt

YEN/$

17,

co

t·h,I.I( (I \

DM/$

V
k

Obs

Pk

286
271
256
248
236
232

.081 ()
.089 '"
.172
.096 -.,
.045
.018

SE

DW

.047*
.047*
.052**
.053*
.054
.054
.053
.053
.653**
.052**
.051 **
.049**
.047**
.045**
.044**

2.038
.177
.087
.068
.047

Pk

SE

DW

(Wks)

-~)

8
16
20
26
28
30
32
34
36
38
40
42
44
46

f'.

228

-.015

224
220
216
212
208
204

-.058
-.111
-.174
-.241
-.307
-.381
-.457
-.516

200

196

.044

.038
.038
.033
.029
.026
.029
.028
.026
.022

r

.009
.005
.109
.078
.045
.014
-.019
-.053
-.086
-.126
-.167
-.211
-.260
-.314
-.364

.046
.046
.048*
.049*
.048
.048
.047
.046
.047*
.047**
.047**
.048**
.048**
.047**
.047**

I

'f
.

1.928
.211
.114
.089
.058
.057
.053
.048
.040
.035
.032
.029
.029
.024
.018

• Each currency given an intercept teon which is not reported.

* Significant at the 5% (one-tailed) level.
** Significant at the 1% (one-tailed) level.

Table IV shows estimates of Pk in the regression (St +k- St) = Pk(SC St-k) + 'Yt,
for k={l, 8, 16,20,26,28,30,32,34,36,38,40,42,44, 46}, for both the Y/$ and DMI$
spot rates. The estimates are plotted in Figure II. The results show negative
auto correlations in long-horizon differences of spot rates. These data indicate that

v"

~

\,r. A
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both the Y/$ and DMI$ spot rates begin to exhibit mean reverting beha,ior around
the 30 week interval.

Figure II: Seemingly Unrelated Estimates of
k-Difference Autocorrelations
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As hypothesized, the negative autocorrelations continue to decrease as the
time horizon is lengthened. After 46 weeks, the transitory component of the Y/S
and DMI$ spot rates accounts for approximately 50% and 36% of the variation in
exchange rates, respectively. These estimates support the above evidence from
Table TIl which suggests that the DMI$ spot rate contains a smaller transitory
component than the Y/$ rate at the one week horizon; or similarly, the mean
reversion of the DMI$ spot rate is smaller than that of the Y/$ spot rate at a given
time. After 40 weeks, for example, the transitory component accounts for 30% of
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the variation in the Y/$ exchange rate, while for the DMJ$ rate, the transitory
component explains 20% of the variation. I7
As the coefficients continue to decline over longer horizons, the standard
errors become relatively small, and t-values increase. T -values near the early
stages of mean reversion (k=26-34), on the other hand, are quite small.
Interpretation of the regression coefficients for these shorter horizons is
~ti~allurohlematic.

However, as ~uizi.nga (1987) note~:

rv./tt

rV .. (M.

I~

wt 'ttf ~,!:n

.)

Lrl ({ , i ( .

\lJ~
.'j

/J.h.: .(.."(. ~.

While the magnitude of these de~iatfons froth random~w~ behavior is
obviously large in an economic sense, it is not significant in a statistical
sense. Someone with strong a priori information that real exchange rates
are random walks need not be persuaded otherwise by the data. Nonetheless,
those who look to the data to obtain a reasonable "best guess" are unlikely
to select a random-walk specification to describe long-run behavior of real
exchange rates (p.186).

IV. h. Sources of Temporary Components
The assertion that foreign exchange rates may contain a transitory
component can be motivated intuitively by considering, for example, monetary
policies of the Federal Reserve. In October of 1979 the Fed reaffirmed its
commitment to a stable monetary policy. _Subsequent perception of the Fed's
credibility could have led market participants to expect the Fed to correct any
deviations of the money supply froni its expected growth target. For instance, if
the money supply announcement were greater than the expected level, the
anticipation of future tightening would cause an increase in the current interest
rate, and these higher interest rates would lead to an increase in the demand for
dollar denominated assets, thus causing an appreciation of the dollar. Similarly,
if the commitment of other public and private actions designed to prevent extreme
17 See Appendix A for OLS estimates.

,.
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'\ olatility of currencies were also perceived as credible, market participants would
expect a certain level of stability in the long run. This intuitive outline rooted in
monetarist theories is by no means exhaustive; nevertheless, given investors'
expectation of these various intervention policies, it would not be surprising to
discover temporary movements in exchange rates.
Interpreting the predictability of long-horizon movements in asset prices
caused by a transitory component is subject to two competing economic
explanations. Implied temporary swings away from fundamental values can be
interpreted as supporting an inefficient market hypothesis (or as a rejection of the
equilibrium asset pricing models). On the other hand, the presence of such
behavior could also result from time-varying risk factors, in which case the
swings constitute variations in equilibrium expected values. I8
Another possible suggestion can be found in the stock market literature.
Recently, De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman (1990) showed that the
existence of transitory components in stock prices can be explained if market
participants are either sophisticated investors (Le., those who use fundamental
analysis) or noise traders. DSSW argued that with the

un~<4.£tab~~ure~!

noise traders' misconceptions of fundamental values, noise traders may be
compensated for bearing the additional risk which they themselves create; thus,
in arbitraging to exploit noise traders' opinions, sophisticated investors must
bear the additional risk that misconceptions will become even more extreme. If
noise traders' misconceptions are serially correlated, sophisticated investors will
not be willing to bet as heavily against noise traders. If we assume that some
market participants are passive (not responding to noise or betting against noise

18 Fama and French (1988) provide an intuitive explanation of how these opposite positions can imply similar
predictability in stock prices. A formal discussion can be found in Summers and Poterba (1988).
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trades), the temporary nature of the noise traders' errors can cause asset prices
to deviate temporarily from fundamental values.
Yet another cause of temporary fluctuations in exchange rates may be
found by considering coordinated exchange rate policies between countries. The
extreme volatility of exchange rates, since floating regimes were implemented in
1973, led monetary authorities to coordinate attempts to stabilize currencies.
Unlike the stock market, exchange rate markets can be influenced directly by
coordinated policy intervention.
Concerned with increasing U.S. external trade deficits and the ballooning
dollar during the mid 1980's, finance ministers of the G5 agreed during their
famous Plaza meeting in February 1985 to pursue direct intervention in order to
drive the dollar lower. 19 Other well publicized accords aimed at stabilizing
exchange rates include the Baker-Miyazawa Pact of 1986 and the Louvre Accord
in February 1987. The purpose of these meetings, ostensibly, was to obtain
commitments to coordinate intervention policies in order to stabilize exchange
rates. Commitments alone, however, do not stabilize exchange markets.
If a shock causes the demand for dollars to fall, we could observe an

appreciation of the Y and the DM, as investors shift their demand from dollar
denominated assets into Y and DM denominated assets. The commitment of
intervention by central monetary organizations to support the dollar from any
additional depreciation could result in the dollar taking only a temporary swing.
Similarly, an increase in demand for dollars, followed by intervention to bring the
dollar back down, would also result in only a temporary fluctuation. The
existence of temporary movements, then, depends to a certain degree on the extent
and effectiveness of intervention.
19 Whether or not the subsequent depreciation of the dollar would have occurred regardless of the G5 intervention
is questionable. The G5 includes the United states, Gennany (then West Gennany), France, Japan and Britain.
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As the evidence in Table III and IV suggests, the Y/$ spot rate seems to
contain a larger temporary component than the DMI$. This empirical observation
can be supported by considering the institutional structure which anchors the D:-'l
- the European Monetary System. One of the main goals of the EMS is to limit
exchange rate volatility between member countries, with the German DM serving
as the anchor currency. Prior to the Basle-Nyborg meetings in September 1987,
intervention was obligatory when an EMS member currency reached the 2.25%
margin around the EMS valuated exchange rate. Unlike this "red-light"
intervention, West Germany agreed, after September 1987, to finance "orangelight" interventions before a currency reached its ceiling or floor rate; that is,
Germany was readily willing to intervene in matters concerning EMS
members. 20
If the Y and DM appreciate as investors shift their demand from dollar

denominated assets to DM and Y denominated assets, the Y/$ and DMI$ spot rates
will fall. To maintain stability of the dollar, intervention from the Bank of Japan

would support the dollar and drive the Y/$ spot rate back to a more appropriate
level. Before West Germany can intervene to strengthen the dollar, however, its
important position in the EMS warrants priority attention. The appreciation of
the DM against the French franc, for example, could cause the Bundesbank to

intervene by purchasing French francs

in".?J;de~!'[g.e DM/f.fr r3~~~<" U' ~...

the prescribed EMS margin. As a result, GermanYJi'DM holdings would fall
while its Ffr reserves would rise. This

m~em-e-nt1n the domestic DM supply

could cause interest rates in Germany to riLe. 21 These

'iJ

1ff.ph~r interests rates
ptrJ'i

20 "A long Road to Reform," The Economist, March 26, 1988, p.86.
21 Another possibility is that Germany could Sell DM, in which case the domestic money supply would increase,
and its interest rates fall. However, it was well known in the 1980's that the Bundesbank was reluctant to gamble
because of its inflationary anxiety. This anxiety caused the Bundesbank to be reluctant to sell DM. See "Francly
Speaking," The Economist, January 10, 1987, p.66.
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would then lead to increased demand for DM denominated assets, thus keeping
the DM strong.
A possible implication, then, is that because of Germany's priority position
'within the EMS, the Bundesbank may be slower to react directly in the DMiS
market. This seems to suggest that a positive shock to the DM caused by investors
shifting their demand from dollars to DMs will only be augmented by Germany's
efforts to maintain EMS parities. The delayed intervention to maintain dollar
stability may result in temporary shocks to the DMI$ exchange rate which take
longer to return to fundamentallevels. 22
Directly obtaining empirical evidence which supports this hypothesis is
quite difficult. Central monetary authorities are hesitant to provide details
concerning the number and size of direct interventions. News from the financial
grapevine, however, may provide some insight. As the dollar kept depreciating in
1987, stories spread that the Secretary of Treasury, James Baker 3d, continued to
urge Japan and West Germany to stimulate their domestic demand. At the April
1987 meeting in Washington of the G7 finance ministers, Kiichi Miyazawa,
Japan's Minister of Finance, presented stimulative fiscal measures for Japan.
Vlest German's finance minister, Gerhard Stoltenberg, did not. 23 Later in 1987,
Baker was reported to have criticized the Germans for not lowering their interest
rates.
When the dollar recovered in 1989 and seemed to be appreciating too
quickly, the Germans did not freely intervene to put depreciating pressures on the
dollar. A Wall Street Journal article quotes an economist from Salomon as
saying, "Whenever the market has put the most pressure on the Bundesbank to
22 That is to say, ~k in equation (6.b) - the proportion of the variation of the k-period difference in exchange rates
which is explained by the mean reversion of the decaying transitory component - will be smaller for the DM/$
spot rate than the ¥!$ spot rate, as was reported in Table IV.
23 "On the Skids," The Economist, April 18, 1989, p.76.
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tighten, it has resisted."24 The Germans were reluctant to raise domestic interest
rates to help depreciate the dollar.
Intervention by the Japanese, on the other hand, seems to have been more
direct and aggressive. During 1987, though central banks from various nations
intervened in exchange markets to assist in pegging-up the depreciating dollar,
"The Japanese [were] clearly at the forefront of the currency battle ... Japan
seemed to be the only country making a genuine effort. "25 These comments from
the financial press are intended to serve only as a brief glance into the
complexities involved in exchange rate policy coordination. They merely provide
insights into one possible suggestion as to how a delayed response from central
monetary authorities could lead to a slower correction of temporary swings in
exchange rates.

Vt at Exchang'e Rate Expectations
Given that transitory components cause exchange rates to exhibit mean
reverting behavior, how are expectations of future spot rates influenced by this
temporary swing? Specifically, are expectations consistent with the behavior
implied in the long horizon movement of exchange rates? If investors expect
exchange rates to revert to a mean, it seems intuitive that a past appreciation of a
currency leads investors to expect a future depreciation, and vice versa. 26 This
final section of the paper examines some of the different specifications of
expectations. These mechanisms are intended to provide only a picture of possible
specifications most likely to be used in forming expectations.

24 "Dollar gains continue despite intervention," (Foreign Exchange) (column) by Michael Sesit il28 col in. Wall
September 6, 1989. pC I.

Street Journal,

25 "Japan resigns itself to dollar's weakness; central bank concentrates on steadying the fall. "(International
News) by Kathryn Graven. Wall Street Journal. December 2. 1987. p.24.
f"" tP,
26 The key assumption is that they expect no changes in fundamentals.
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Using forecasts from the Financial Report, Amex Bank Review, and MMS
for various horizons, Frankel and Froot (1987, 1988) examine different
specifications for how expectations are formed. The general framework begins
with the assumption that the expected future spot rate is a weighted average of the
contemporaneous spot rate,

Stl

and other factors,

Xt:

where St is the log of the
spot rate and set+n is the log
of the expected future spot
rate for t+n at t.
Examining the weight investors (survey respondents) place on the other factors
allows us to distinguish how expectations are formed. The null that expectations
are random walks, or static, is /3=0. The task is then to examine different
candidates for the other factors,

Xt.

v. b. Extrapolative Expectations
Suppose, for simplicity, that expectations are formed as a distributive lag,
with investors assigning a weight of co to the lagged spot rate and a weight of (I-co)
to the current spot rate:
(11) set+1 = (l-co)st + COSt-l

where St is the log of the
spot rate and set+1 is the
expected future spot rate
for t+1 at time t.
If we subtract the current spot rate from both sides, we get the expected

depreciation (appreciation) of the spot rate as proportional to the current change
in the spot rate:
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(12.a)

Set+l - St

(12.b)

= - WSt + WSt-b or

~Set+l = - W~St

:::-

\)

6{ 5.t ~
I

Frankel and Froot term this model "extrapolative expectations". If investors
extrapolate the most recent trend (i.e., 0><0), then they exhibit "bandwagon
expectations". If, for example, a currency has recently appreciated, investors
would expect the appreciation to continue and they would increase their demand
for the currency; similarly, if a depreciation of the currency has recently occurred,
future depreciation would be expected. This type of extrapolation of recent trends
seems to be consistent with the chartists perspective (investors who project trends
from charts).
Then, if chartists were to dominate foreign exchange markets, the
bandwagon effects would make the markets somewhat de-stabilizing. Frankel
and Froot (1990) note that during the 1980's a move was made away from
fundamental analysis to more technical or chartists methods by many of the
leading institutions involved in exchange rate trading. Balancing this destabilizing influence, however, is the transitory component in exchange rates. If
investors are aware of the mean reverting behavior of exchange rates, then their
chartists tendencies may be suspended.
Table V reports SUR estimates of the coefficient in equation (12.b), the
extrapolative expectations equation. These results seem to contradict Frankel and
Froot's (1988) finding that short term expectations exhibit bandwagon tendencies.
i e•

Their estimates from using the MMS one week and one month forecasts indicate
that given a 10% appreciation,

th~ spot rate is expected~preciate an additional

1.35% and .54% over the next one week and one month, respectively.

24

Table V depicts a different scenario. One week expectations for both the V/$
and DMIS spot rates are "stabilizing" and are significant at the 5% and 7.5% levels,
respectively; since the spot rates are in logarithmic form, a 10% appreciation

Table V
Extrapolative Expectations Model
Independent Variables: St-St-l
SUR regressions of: set +1 - St = ex - m(st - St-I)

Spot Rate

Forecast

Dates

t:

00

fIi,l

I

'I ..-:'J'-I r'
'.
1-, <-I'. v,.)

One Week

l In/84-8/2/89

.081

ttS

.

11 (j.~

J

DM/$

DW

(J):::()

5'~ /jt~' '{
5t;· ~ bt ?

1.626*

L511

.324

L340

1.803**

1.870

1.131

1.313

(.049)

One Month

lIn/84-8/2/89

.017
(.054)

¥/$

One Week

lIn/84-8/2/89

.069
(.038)

One Month

lIn/84-8/2/89

.066
(.058)

• Ho: Random Walk or Static Expectations, 00=0.

HI: Non-Bandwagon, 00>0.
•• Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Each currency given an intercept term
which is not reported.
* Significant at approximately the 7.5% (one-tailed) level.
** Significant at the 5% (one-tailed) level

of the DM/$ spot rate over the past week leads to an expected depreciation of .81%
for the following week. Similarly, a 10% appreciation in the V/$ spot rate will lead
to an expected depreciation of .69% in the next seven days.27 In contrast to the one
27 Since exchange rates seem to exhibit mean reversion around 30 weeks, it may seem odd that expectations for one
week are not extrapolative. One interpretation of the bandwagon tendency reported by Frankel and Froot is that
investors anticipate mean reversion sometime in the far future. It can be interpreted that, as long as /00/<1, the
extrapolative model of expectations is not de-stabilizing. The fact that the absolute value of the coefficient is less
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week expectations, results of extrapolative expectations for the one month horizon
do not provide conclusive evidence. The estimates are not at all significant. The
extrapolative expectations model does not seem to adequately portray expectations
for longer horizons. 28
The discrepancy in estimates for the one week extrapolative model can be
explained if we consider the two different sample periods. Expectations data used
by Frankel and Froot (1988) covered the dollar's alleged "bubble" path between
June 1984 and February 1986. 29 In 1984, the dollar began its steady and consistent
appreciation; the mood of the market may have been similar to Schiller's "fads"
model. At any moment during this period, the chartists' techniques or technical
analysis would have predicted continued appreciation. Seeing the rest of the
market profit from speculating on the dollar's appreciation would have lured
many to join the "bandwagon".30 The dollar reached its peak in February of 1985
and began its steady fall; ,this subsequent period of depreciation could have
provided another foundation for speculative,

ban~wagon

expectations. It seems,

then, that the bandwagon tendencies observed by Frankel and Froot (1988) can be
explained, to a certain extent, by the speculative character of their sample period.
The expectations data used in this paper extend well beyond the volatile mid
1980's and into the era of international exchange rate coordination. As the dollar
continued its depreciation, finance ministers from the leading industrialized
countries began discussing ways to curb excessive volatility within exchange
markets. As discussed earlier, two important meetings in November 1986 and
than unity implies a slowly decaying influence of a previous trend; for example, if a 10% appreciation in the past
week leads investors to "extrapolate" a less than 10%, say 3%, appreciation for the following week. then this
suggests that investors expect the current trend to continue, but not to the same extent.
28 We must note that mean reversion in exchange rates around 30 weeks does not imply similar behavior in
forecasters' expectations. Forecasts are affected by factors other than that which can be measured in time series
analysis. Thus, it is not inconsistent to have mean reversion in exchange rates at long horizons and also to have
forecasters expect "mean reversion" to occur as quickly as a week.
29 Frankel and Froat (1988) provides a discussion of both rational and irrational bubbles.
30 Levich (1989) cites studies which conclude that investors could profit from such "filter" techniques (p.44).
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February 1987 arguably seemed to signal the end of excessive volatility such as the
alleged "bubble" path of the mid 1980's. In November 1986, Treasury Secretary
Baker met with Japan's Finance Minister, Miyazawa; they agreed that the dollar
had fallen enough and that future concerns should focus on stability. This
position was reiterated during the Louvre Accord in February 1987. Agreeing that
the dollar had fallen to a more fundamental level, the finance minsters of the G7
publicly committed themselves to helping stabilize exchange markets.
Understandably, if investors believed these commitments to be credible,
speculating on another swing of the dollar similar to that of the mid 1980's would
not have been perceived as profitable. Swings in exchange rates would be short
lived. In such a market, participants would be unlikely to bet that trends would
continue without intervention from monetary authorities. The profitable strategy,
then, would seem to be the one which speculates against recent trends. Thus, the
credibility of the various monetary authorities to maintain a stable dollar may
have influenced the way in which short term expectations were formed.
To test the hypothesis that coefficients for the extrapolative expectations

Table VI
Chow F Statistics
Extrapolative Expectations

FDMwk

F¥wk

FDMmth

F¥mth

5.00*

5.78*

8.69**

8.04**

... Significant at the 5% leve1.
...... Significant at the 1% level.

specification did not remain constant throughout the two sample periods, a Chow
test was performed by dividing the data set into two sub-periods: the approximate
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period covered by the Frankel and Froot data set (1984 through 1986), and the
period between 1987 through 1989. Results in Table VI indicate that coefficients
for extrapolative expectations were not constant through the two sub-periods.

Y, c, Regressiye Expectations
We have seen evidence which suggests that mean reversion in nominal
exchange rates occur at relatively long horizons. Naturally, the next step is to
examine how expectations are formed relative to long horizon movements in spot
rates. Again, the specification for such an expectations model can be in Frankel
and Froot's (1988) study. Using the longer horizon forecasts provided by Amex

Bank Review and the Financial Report, Frankel and Froot (1988) found that
expectations for these horizons exhibited a regressive tendency. That is to say,
over time investors expected exchange rates to move towards a long-run
equilibrium level, s* t. Frankel and Froot (1988) assumed that expected spot rates
were a weighted average of the current spot rate and a long-run equilibrium rate
(defined in terms of fundamental notions such as PPP):

where S*l is a long-run equilibrium exchange
rate)l
Re-arranging, we get the following in terms of expected depreciation:

31 s* t =So + log (P I P* ), where So is the log of the average nominal value of the foreign exchange currency in
tenns of dollars, 1973 - 1979, and P is the domestic ratio of the current CPI to the average CPI for 1973-1979 and
p* is the foreign ratio of the current ratio of the current CPI to the average CPI for 1973-1979.
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If8 >0, the spot rate is expected to move towards s*t. If8 <0 the expected
spot rate moves away from the long-run equilibrium. Frankel and Froot's results
shed more light on exchange rate behavior. Their specification, however, for the
equilibrium rate seems inappropriate. Their long run equilibrium is calculated
using PPP for 1973 through 1979. To use this value as a proxy for the long run
equilibrium rate during the 1980's is questionable. Presumably, the early period of
floating exchange rate regimes was affected by factors driving PPP, such as the
selection of appropriate price indices, etc., which were completely different in the
1980's. There is no reason to believe that factors such as relative prices between
countries remained constant over the two time periods.
Since we are interested in how expectations are formed in light of mean
reversion, a simple but effective model would be to test if investors expect
exchange rates to return to their mean. Given the large number of observations
(288 weeks), the sample mean should be a good proxy for the true mean (the
possibility that the true mean may not have been constant throughout the sample
period is addressed below). Suppose then, that expected future spot rates are a
function of the contemporaneous spot rate and the mean spot rate. If we replace
s* in equation (14) with the sample mean, Sm, then 8 measure the speed at which
the spot rate is expected to move towards the mean (This specification will be
termed Mean Regressing Expectations.) If 8>0 the spot rate is expected to move
towards the mean. Verifying this hypothesis would be consistent with mean
reversion; namely, if exchange rates are currently above the long run average,
then investor's who expect mean reversion would anticipate future exchange
rates to fall towards the mean. Table VII reports estimates of 8.
Expectations for longer horizons should be better explained by
specifications which take into consideration current spot rate movements relative
to a "long run equilibrium". ResUlts in Table VII seem to support this notion.
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Table VII
Mean Regressive Expectations
Independent Variables: SCSm
SUR regressions of: Set+l - St = a - 8(st - sm)

Spot Rate

Forecast

Dates

8

t: 8=0

DW

.0067

1.570*

1.450

5.277**

1.526

1.315

1.744

3.688**

1.324

DM/$

One Week

lIn/84-8/2/89

(.0043)

One Month

l In /84-8/2/89

.0278
(.0052)

¥/$

One Week

l In /84-8/2/89

.0036
(.0027)

One Month

11n/84-8/2/89

.0175
(.0047)

• Ho: Random Walk or Static Expectations, 9=0.

HI: Mean Regressive, 9>0.
• Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Each currency is given an intercept
term which is not reported.
* Significant at the 5% (one-tailed) level.
** Significant at the 1% (one-tailed) level.

Not only are the coefficients for the one month forecasts larger than the
coefficients for the one week forecasts, but they are more significant. As we can
see from Table VII, exchange rates are expected to move toward their sample
mean. If the current DMI$ spot rate is 10% above its mean, forecasters expect it to
fall .28% towards the sample mean over the next month.
Of course, using the mean for the entire sample in the independent variable
may not be appropriate, since it is possible that the true mean varies over time. In
our data sample, two distinct periods become obvious: the large swing in the dollar
between 1984 and 1986, and the subsequent rather stable period between 1987 and
1989. Though the true mean and its innovations cannot be observed, if a change in
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the mean actually occurred, these two periods may provide some insight. I
estimated the Mean Regressing Expectations for these two period using their
respective sample means. Table VIII reports the Chow test results.

Table VIII
Chow F Statistics
FDMwk

5.02*

FDMmth

9.83**

9.72**

4.12*

* Significant at the 5% level.
** Significant at the 1% level.
These critical F values allow us to reject the null that coefficients on the Mean
Regressing Expectations model remained constant throughout the two different
periods.

VI. Conclusions
Using a similar technique that Fama and French (1988) applied to stock
prices, this paper focused on the long run predictability of nominal exchange
rates. Both the theoretical and empirical results su%gest that accepted tests of
random walks cannot be simply accepted.

Ratherf,~~~t";~srieem to be positively
I

~

correlated over short horizons (up to around thirty weeks) and negatively
correlated over long intervals. This behavior is consistent with the statistical
hypothesis that exchange rates contain a slowly decaying stationary component.
The negative auto correlations over long intervals are caused by the mean
reversion of this temporary component.

!
·l
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In addition, the results in Section V (based on data for 1984 through 1989)
indicate that standard methods of specifying expectations produce estimates
which are consistent with the mean reversion in exchange rates; a past
appreciation leads to an expected depreciation, and vice versa. As with many
empirical studies, however, this paper raises additional questions. Particularly,
the consistency of expectations with mean reversion of exchange rates contradicts
Frankel and Froot's (1988) finding (based on data for 1984 through 1886) that one
week and one month expectations are formed extrapolatively based on recent
trends.
The hypothesis which naturally stems from such a contradiction is that we
have no reason to believe expectations remained constant throughout the different
sample periods. Specifically, the shift to international exchange rate coordination
in 1986-1987 seems to provide an extremely plausible juncture at which
expectations may have been altered. Within such a context, it should not be
surprising that Frankel and Froot (1988) observed "bandwagon" tendencies; their
sample period coincided with the ballooning roller coaster ride of the dollar
during the mid 1980's. The data used in this paper extend well beyond this volatile
period into the relatively stable years of international exchange rate coordination.
Such a policy shift in 1986-1987 could arguably have had an affect on the way in
which expectations were formed. Simple Chow tests support the hypothesis that
regression coefficients of expectations models did not remain constant throughout
the two sample periods, 1984-1986 and 1987-1989.
,
face~paced,

,

To the outsider, the foreign exchange market is imagined as a

high-tech, high-power playground where the wealth of men in red susp~nders are
made (and lost) based on the latest piece of information flashing across electronic
boards. Predicting long run movements in such a market may seem like an
impossible task. The fact that major international financial institutions are
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willing to support their exchange rate traders with millions of dollars in such an
unpredictable environment may shock the un-initiated. However, results in this
paper suggest that long horizon movements in exchange rates may be less risky
than what are implied by extrapolating short run trends; and in addition to
statistical tests on actual spot rate fluctuations, forecasts by leading institutional
participants seem to support this notion of predictability in the long run.

APPENDIX A
Results in Table IV were estimated using Seemingly Unrelated
Regressions. Using monthly stock returns, Fama and French (1988) estimate the
same equations, but with OLS. Huizinga (1987) used OLS on monthly real
exchange rates. This appendix reports estimates of the k-difference
autocorrelations using OLS. In order to avoid the biases in OLS estimates, Fama
and French (1988) constructed simulations to estimate bias adjustments. They
report that when stock prices have stationary components which produce negative
autocorrelations, the simulations generate estimates which are similar to OLS
estimates. OLS seems to have little bias.

OLS Estimates of Equation (6.a)
(St +k- St) =

(X

+ ~k(St- St-k) + 'Yt

DMI$

YEN/$
Obs

k

~k

SE

DW

~k

SE

DW

(Wks)

1
8
16
20
26

286
272
256
248
236

.067
.059
.152
.061**
.220
.064**
.201
.066**
.213
.065**
~232 ____.209
.065**
30 228
.T72--- -.O(iS**
32 224
.115
.065*
34 220
.056
.064
-.007
36 216
.064
-.086
.063
38 212
40 208
-.167
.062**
42 204
-.245
.062**
44 200
-.319
.061**
46 196
-.370
.060**

2.010
.190
.091
.075
.056
.054-.047
.046
.038
.032
.029
.033
.031
.028
.023

.045
.128
.294
.291
.286
.266
.231
.188
.157
.128
.088
.043
-.015
-.073
-.120

• Each currency given an intercept tenn which is not reported.
* Significant at the 5% (one-tailed) level.
** Significant at the 1% (one-tailed) level.

.452
.060*
.059**
.059**
.058**
.058**
.057**
.057**
.057**
.058*
.059
.060
.062
.063
.065*

1.999
.242
.143
.118
.080
.080
.073
.069
.057
.048
.044
.037
.038
.029
.023

OLS Estimates of the K-Difference Autocorrelations

f3

o
-0.1
-02
-0.3
~A

-----------------------------~~!~-------- I::~ I
-----------------------------------~~;------
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•
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Qualitatively, the above results are similar to those in Table IV. The Y/$
spot rate seems to contain a larger temporary component. The autocorrelations
for the Y/$ become negative around the 36 week horizon, whereas the DMI$ begins
to revert to the mean around the 42 week interval (Using SUR, the coefficients
became negative at the 30 week horizon.) This suggests that the Y/$ reverts to the
mean earlier than the DMI$. At the 42 week horizon, for example, mean reversion
in the Y/$ transitory component accounts for approximately 24% of the variation
in the spot rate; the transitory component for the DMI$ accounts for much less at
.15% of the variation in the spot rate.
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